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FLOWS OF CAPITAL AND FORMS OF INDUSTRY IN EU- 
ROPE, 1500-1900 
CHARLES TILLY 
Early Forms of Capitalist Industryl 
"Manufacture," writes John Merrington, "enormously:e~ipaods tra~-sobial.' 
productivity of labour by the multiplication of detailed functions, subordi- 
nating whole areas of the country and branches of production to the urban 
capital ist . . ."  But, says Merrington: 
Production is only modified by subdivision of tasks; the labour process itself is merely taken 
over from preceding modes of production. With the advent of machine production this 
framework is qualitatively altered; capital seizes hold of the real substance of the labour 
process, dynamically reshaping and diversifying all branches of production by the technical- 
organisational transformation of the productive process. The removal of all fetters on the 
mobility of labour and the separation of one secondary process after another from agricul- 
t u r e . . ,  opens the way to an accelerated, permanent urbanisation based on the "concentra- 
tion of the motive power of society in big cities" (Marx) and the subordination of agriculture 
as merely one branch of industry. The dominance of the town is no longer externally 
imposed: it is now reproduced as part of the accumulation process, transforming and 
spatially reallocating rural production "from within". The territorial division of labour is 
redefined, enormously accentuating regional inequalities: far from overcoming rural back- 
wardness . . ,  capitalist urbanisation merely reproduces it, subordinating the country on a 
more intensive basis. 2 
Merrington's gloss on Marx challenges the unilinear view of industrializa- 
tion that took hold of western thought during the nineteenth century. Not for 
Merrington, or Marx, the idea of a backward countryside in the midst of 
which progressive centers of concentrated manufacturing grew up. Not for 
either one the notion of "penetration" of slow-moving rural areas by urban 
ideas and goods. The Marxist account of industrialization begins with an 
intensive interaction of city and village. 
Yet Merrington's summary - and many other like it - holds to the 
conventional emphasis on machine production as the great break within the 
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process of industrialization. Prior to that break, he tells us, "Production is 
only modified by subdivision of tasks; the labour process itself is merely 
taken over from preceding modes of production." There Merrington (and 
perhaps Marx as well) slips into error. For the more European historians 
delve into the early experience of industrialization, the more they discover 
profound transformations of the relations of production prior to the exten- 
sive mechanization of industry. The farther the inquiry goes, the more it 
appears that redeployment of capital and labor makes the big difference, and 
that mechanization is only one of several means by which that redeployment 
occurred in Europe. More careful examination of the ostensibly peripheral 
processes of"protoindustrialization" and "deindustrialization" reveals three 
important facts: first, that far from being marginal to the main processes of 
European industrialization, protoindustrialization and deindustrialization 
were essential features of the growth of capital-intensive urban industry; 
second, that contrary to the nineteenth- and twentieth-century equating of 
city with industry and urbanization with industrialization, until quite recent- 
ly the major alterations in the relations of industrial production occurred in 
the countryside, as capitalists sought out cheap, docile, relatively immobile 
labor, and moved their capital in response to the availability of that labor; 
third, that despite their apparently antithetical character, protoindustrializa- 
tion and deindustrialization resulted from similar causes, and depended 
closely on each other; in particular, major shifts of capital deindustrialized 
some areas as they promoted the industrialization of others. 
It would not do, however, to dissolve the distinction between the labor 
process of protoindustrialization and the labor process of mechanized urban 
industrialization. The techniques of production and its supervision changed 
relatively little in European protoindustrialization; the big alterations oc- 
curred in the connections among producing units and in the relations be- 
tween the suppliers of capital and the suppliers of labor. Yet those alterations 
had widespread consequences: they produced a scattered but fast-growing 
population of families that were essentially dependent on the sale of their 
labor power for survival - a proletariat, in the classic sense of the word. 
With the concentration of capital, the urban relocation of production, and 
the introduction of machines with inanimate sources of power, the routines 
of work and the relative power of capitalists and workers to control them 
changed dramatically. The active sites of proletarianization moved to cities, 
factories, and other large organizations, as proletarians took on their more 
familiar guise: producing on other people's premises with other people's 
materials and tools, working on fixed schedules under close surveillance. 
Broadly speaking, manufacturing went from a stage in which capitalists 
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sought out labor wherever they could find it, and intervened rather little in 
the labor process itself, to a stage in which they strove - on balance, 
successfully - to reshape the entire process on their own terrain, and their 
own terms. Even in the stage of drastic technical change, the concentration 
and reorganization of capital played a central part. 
This article, then, continues the discussion restarted by John Merrington's 
useful gloss on Marx. It draws extensively on recent local and regional 
studies, especially those that have swirled around the controversial concept 
of "protoindustrialization." It ends up agreeing with the main points of 
Merrington's analysis, but cavilling with a number of Merrington's details 
and emphases. In particular, it disputes Merrington's emphasis on mechani- 
zation as the great break in the process of industrialization. The article's main 
tasks are: 
I. to sketch how that transition to capital-intensive manufacturing 
occurred, 
2. to place protoindustrialization and deindustrialization within the 
process, 
3. to bring out the importance of shifts in the deployment of capital, 
4. to show the continuous interaction of city and country throughout the 
process, and 
5. to stress how much of the whole transformation occurred in the 
countryside, prior to the massive development of factories, steam power, 
and large-scale machine production. 
That the sketch will be sketchy goes without saying. If it helps reveal what is 
at stake in the current scholarly debates over protoindustrialization and 
deindustrialization, it will serve its purpose. 
Protoindustrialization 
Thanks to the recent articulation of economic and demographic history, 
students of European industrialization are at last becoming aware of three 
basic facts about the development of industrial capitalism. First, there is the 
widespread expansion of industrial production in villages and small towns, 
long before power-driven factories played a significant part in manufactur- 
ing - protoindustrialization. Then, there is the considerable proletarianiza- 
tion of the village and small-town population before the massive population 
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redistribution of the nineteenth century. Finally, there is the interdependence 
between the pre-factory expansion of industrial production and the proleta- 
rianization. 3 
Although Europeans of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had no 
reliable explanations of these changes, they certainly had on idea that some 
such changes were happening. As of 1688, Gregory King estimated that of 
the 1.4 million families in England, 364,000 were "labouring people and 
outservants" and another 400,000 "cottagers and paupers. TM As of 1760, 
Joseph Massie was counting a total of 1.5 million families in England and 
Wales; of them, according to Massie, 100,000 were rural producers of wool, 
silk, and other fabrics, and another 100,000 were producers of"Wood,  Iron, 
etc." in the countryside; Massie also counted 200,000 families of husband- 
men and 200,000 families of rural laborers. 5 If so, roughly 40 percent of the 
entire population depended mainly on wages, and at least 13 percent drew 
their wages from manufacturing. 
By 1803, Patrick Colquhoun thought that the 2.2 million families of Eng- 
land and Wales included 340,000 who were laborers in husbandry, 260,000 
pauper laborers, and another 490,000 artisans, handicraft workers, mechan- 
ics, laborers in manufactures, building, mines, canals, etc., most of whom 
were landless wage-workers - not to mention another 222,000 individuals 
Colquhoun called "vagrants. "6 According to any of these informed guesses, 
close to half of all families in England and Wales lived chiefly from the sale of 
their labor power, and a sizeable .minority worked mainly in manufacturing. 
Since no more than 750,000 of the 2.2 million families lived in towns of 2,000 
or more, a. great many of these proletarians clearly eked out their lives in the 
countryside. 
England and Wales were neither precocious nor unique. In the Dutch region 
of Twente, well known through Slicher van Bath's careful studies, 25.2 
percent of the population of 1502 were employed outside of agriculture; by 
1795, the figure was 47.9 percent. 7 Karlheinz Blaschke's comprehensive 
enumeration of the Kingdom of Saxony for the three centuries after 1550 
displays a great progression of the "gardeners and cottars" who supplied the 
bulk of the region's textile workers. The percentage distribution of Saxony's 
rural population followed this pattern: s 
1550 1750 1843 
Peasants 73.5 38.6 20.4 
Gardeners, cottars 6.8 47.9 70.9 
Village labor 18.8 12.7 8.2 
Noble landlords 0.8 0.8 0.5 
Total 99.9 100.0 100.0 
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In the case of Saxony, the absolute number of peasant households remained 
relatively constant over the three centuries; established places on the land 
were few. But the absolute number of rural proletarians grew enormously, 
with the result that peasants diminished radically as a share of the total 
population. 
Saxony's creation of a rural industrial labor force had many parallels else- 
where. In 1774, the percent distribution of the labor force in Basel's rural 
hinterland went as follows. 9 
Peasants 17.6 
Petty trades 27.3 
Handicrafts 29.1 
Shop workers 26.0 
Total 100.0 
82.4 percent of the workers in this eighteenth-century "rural" area, that is, 
earned their wages outside of agriculture. 
Let us take one last case from Bavaria. In a set of villages around Dachau, the 
distribution of the labor force changed only moderately between 1675 and 
1800:l0 
1675 1700 1750 1800 
Peasants 22 22 21 25 
Dependent workers 36 38 36 26 
Independent day-laborers 10 12 13 17 
Non-agricultural trades and crafts 32 28 30 32 
Total 100 100 100 100 
In the Dachau region, the later eighteenth century brought a decline in the 
proportion of dependent workers who lacked their own legal residences in 
the villages, a significant increase in the number of independent day-laborers, 
and a modest rise in the proportion of peasant households. 
As time went on, according to Gerhard Hanke, the craft workers of Old 
Bavaria became a "semi-peasant" class; the population "re-ruralized." At all 
four points in time, nevertheless, more than half the labor force consisted of 
people employed mainly outside of agriculture. Elsewhere in southern Bava- 
ria, rural industry remained the chief activity well into the nineteenth cen- 
tury; genuine "ruralization" came quite recently.11 Yet, Hanke points out, 
historians of Bavaria long described the region as if it had been an essentially 
peasant economy. The "grounds on which previous research drew a picture 
of a peasant Old Bavaria" (as Hanke titles one section of his study) included 
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both the nineteenth-century predominance of the peasantry and the tenden- 
cy of the poor and the unofficially settled to elude seventeenth- and eight- 
eenth-century documents.l~ Afortiori reasoning- supposing that if peasants 
predominated in the nineteenth century they must have predominated even 
more in earlier centuries - made it easier to accept the myth. 
The myth has crumbled. By now a generation's research has made it clear 
that important parts of the eighteenth-century European countryside teemed 
with non-peasants and hummed with manufacturing. We are gradually 
coming to recognize, furthermore, that "cottage industry" was not simply a 
pale anticipation of"real" industry, and not simply a casual supplement to 
agriculture, but a powerful system with its own logic. 
W h a t  M u s t  W e  Expla in?  
Nineteenth-century economic historians, from Marx to Schmoller, re- 
mained well aware of cottage industry and related forms of production. In 
the early twentieth century, Sombart wrote extensively on the Verlagssystem 
- the system in which small merchants gathered raw materials and moved the 
materials through a scattered network of pieceworkers until they had fin- 
ished goods to market.~3 All subsequent economic histories have given rural 
industry a place in the European landscape. Nevertheless, the last few 
decades' work has renewed the question. The renewal has had several 
features: 
1. revealing the enormous extent of small-scale industrial production 
before the rise of the factory, and establishing its predominance in many 
rural areas; 
2. displaying the frequent regional correspondence between intensive but 
small-scale and rural production before 1850 and rapid large-scale 
industrialization - especially outside of heavy industry - after 1850; 
3. showing that small-scale rural industry competed effectively with 
larger-scale urban production for a century or more; 
4. developing a sense that small-scale rural production may have played a 
crucial role in the development of industrial capitalism. 
The fourth feature has inevitably excited the greatest controversy. The 
controversy has heightened when it has come to hypotheses that the growth 
of small-scale rural production a) provided the prime means of primitive 
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capital accumulation, b) had recurrent demographic consequences which 
accelerated population growth, c) therefore promoted the growth of a poor- 
ly-paid proletariat, which eventually became a major source of labor power 
for large-scale capitalist production. 
At their extreme (for example, in the statements of Kriedte, Medick, and 
Schlumbohm) these hypotheses sum to an alternative account of the transi- 
tion from feudalism to capitalism. 14 They present an alternative to the classic 
Marxist account in which three kinds of capital - merchant capital, capital 
accumulated in urban manufacturing, and agrarian capital wrested from a 
dispossessed peasantry - coalesced to provide the basis for large-scale pro- 
duction. The new hypotheses also pose an alternative to the classic liberal 
account, in which expanding trade and developing technology interacted to 
make large-scale production more efficient than other forms. With so crucial 
an outcome at issue, small wonder that bitter arguments continue to rage. 
Small wonder, furthermore, that the very word "protoindustrialization" 
(with its suggestion of a distinctive but standard stage in the creation of 
modern industry) should raise objections, and make some scholars prefer the 
unthreatening simplicity of "cottage industry. ''~5 
Terminology will not resolve the historical questions. Nevertheless, I see great 
advantages in adopting a broad, dynamic, question-posing definition of 
protoindustrialization. Protoindustrialization, in my view, is the increase in 
manufacturing activity by means of the multiplication of very small produc- 
ing units and small to medium accumulations of capital. Negatively, it 
consists of the increase in manufacturing without large producing units and 
great accumulations of capital. Such a definition differs from the semi-offi- 
cial statement proposed by Franklin Mendels and Pierre Deyon - protoin- 
dustrialization as the presence of peasant production for an extra-regional 
market in a situation of tight interdependence between agriculture and 
industry- in two crucial ways.~6 First, my definition is dynamic; it refers to a 
change. Second, it is at once open and agnostic; it leaves open to investiga- 
tion the conditions under which the multiplication of small units and small 
capital accumulations actually occurs; in principle, it allows for the possibili- 
ty that protoindustrialization occurred in cities, isolated from agriculture, 
strongly oriented to nearby markets. Thus the agriculture-industry interde- 
pendence and the extra-regional markets become promising hypotheses. 
concerning the conditions for protoindustrialization, rather than features of 
the process which are present by definition. 
Given such a broad definition, there is no question that during the two 
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centuries after 1650 Europe underwent substantial protoindustrialization: 
manufacturing grew rapidly via the multiplication of small producing units 
and modest accumulations of capital. Large units and big capital may well 
have experienced a relative decline. 
Not that everything stayed the same: far from it! First, as the networks of 
producers and merchants proliferated, the structure of trade altered, and 
large industrial regions came to life. In the world of cheap goods and cheap 
labor, middlemen grew up as never before. Second, protoindustrialization 
transformed the lives of workers - expanding the time they spent on non- 
agricultural pursuits, increasing their dependence on the demand for their 
products, confronting them with petty merchants who had a strong interest 
in cutting their costs, and especially their costs of labor. Most likely- but this 
is where the controversy begins - protoindustrialization also tended to 
promote population growth, proletarianization, and a way of life in which 
fluctuations in employment opportunities affected family strategies and 
welfare as never before. 
The "protoindustrial model" framed by Mendels, Medick, Levine, and 
others enters the intellectual scene at exactly this point. ~7 It states a set of 
connected hypotheses about the causes, correlates, and consequences of 
protoindustrialization. The main arguments run as follows: 
1. In so far as population density was high, agriculture within a compact 
region was divided between large commercial farms and smallholdings, 
opportunities for profitable out-migration were few, and external markets 
for goods whose production required low capital investment were available, 
petty merchants were likely to promote protoindustrialization. 
2. To the extent that these conditions obtained and protoindustrialization - 
an increase in manufacturing through the multiplication of small producing 
units and modest concentrations of capital - occurred, the populations 
involved were likely to reorient their family strategies from the inheritance of 
places on the land or in restricted crafts to opportunities for paid employ- 
ment. 
3. The simultaneous or seasonal involvement of industrial workers in agricul- 
ture (both on their own account and as wage-labor for large farmers) reduced 
the reproduction cost of labor, raised the land productivity of agriculture, 
and accentuated the orientation of worker families to paid employment. 
4. Frequently, this reorientation to employment opportunities meant rising 
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marital fertility, increased nuptiality, and an asymmetrical response to good 
times and bad - nuptiality and fertility rising in good times, but failing to 
decline proportionately in bad times - so that the medium-run consequence 
of fluctuations in the market for industrial products was increasing vulnera- 
bility and immiseration. 
5. The presence of such a vulnerable, miserable, and industrially-disciplined 
labor force promoted mercantile capital accumulation; given locational or 
technical advantages of concentration, it also facilitated the creation of large, 
capital-intensive units of production. 
As we move down the list, the arguments become increasingly controversial. 
To the extent that we take them to describe the main conditions and 
mechanisms of Europe's shift from agrarian to industrial organization, they 
pose a dramatic challenge to conventional wisdom - whether liberal or 
Marxist. 
As things now stand, the fact of protoindustrialization is well established, but 
the evidence for each element of the "protoindustrial model" is mixed. Part 
of the problem is quantitative: not having a good enough inventory of 
relevant cases to know whether those populations whose behaviors fit the 
model were rare, frequent or preponderant. Part is qualitative: not having 
firm enough control over the well-documented instances to be sure how 
closely the relevant behavior - the asymmetrical response to employment 
opportunities, the capital accumulation, and so on - conformed to the 
model. Part of the problem, finally, is neither quantitative nor qualitative, 
but descriptive: specifying in which times and places protoindustrialization 
was actually occurring, and in which times and places the model should 
therefore, in principle, apply: does the fact that great landlords of Eastern 
Europe sometimes forced their serfs into industrial production as a source of 
cash for the landlord's estate, for example, challenge the model? I think n o t -  
but clearly we need a better specification of the model's domain. 
For the moment, let us stop with a prudent understatement: before capital- 
intensive manufacturing became dominant, Europe underwent substantial 
industrialization through the multiplication of small producing units and 
modest capital concentrations over the territory of rural regions organized 
around mercantile cities; in regions where that happened, many of the 
changes described by the "protoindustrial model" seem to have occurred 
together. As Milward and Saul sum it up: 
Paradoxically, in spite of the very few successes which government policies of industrialisa- 
tion achieved and the noticeable decay of many old-established industries, the eighteenth 
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century was a period of marked industrialisation. The industrialisation was of a quite 
different kind from that which most governments had sought to establish. Its most general 
aspect everywhere was the part-time employment of the rural labour force in manufacturing 
activities carried on in their own homes... It is impossible not to be struck by the 
extraordinary growth of spinning and weaving in the countryside of many European areas. 
In some areas the manufacture of iron products, toys or watches developed in the same way, 
but textiles, whether of linen, wool or the newfangled cotton were the typical rural product. 
The technological transformations which initiated the Industrial Revolution in Britain, were 
heavily concentrated in these rural textile industries and their development on the continent 
may therefore be seen as the true precursor of the Industrial Revolution there rather than the 
older 'manufactures'. But setting on one side the developments of the Industrial Revolution 
itself and looking at the matter simply from the point of view of employment in industrial 
activities whether those industries were "revolutionised" or not it would still be true to say 
that the most industrial landscapes in late eighteenth-century Europe, for all their lack of 
chimneys, were the country areas around Lille, Rouen, Barcelona, Zurich, Basel and 
Geneva. 18 
Mi lward  and Saul  unders ta te  the extent  to which rural  industry  served as a 
dominan t  and full-t ime employment  in Europe 's  zones of  intense pro to in-  
dustr ial izat ion.  But their  main  point  deserves emphasis ,  because the nine- 
teenth century forgot  it so completely:  Europe  industr ial ized significantly 
before 1800, and  did so mainly through the employment  of  rural  labor.  
The dispersion of industry,  however,  did not  dest roy the or ientat ion to cities. 
Broadly  speaking,  e ighteenth-century Europe  organized as a series of  re- 
gions, each conta ining a dominan t  city, a subordina te  hierarchy of  cities, and 
an agricul tural  hinter land f rom which the cities drew the major  part  of  their 
subsistence. Some of  those ci ty-hinterland sets consti tuted industr ial  sys- 
tems: innumerable  scattered producers ,  l inked by petty merchants  and man-  
ufaeturers  to the major  markets  and  large capital ists  located in the regional  
capitals.  Tile list included not only the Lille, Rouen,  Barcelona, Zurich,  Basel 
and  Geneva mentioned by Milward  and Saul,  but  also Leeds, Manchester ,  
Milan,  Lyon,  and others  as well. The bulk of  the industr ia l  l abor  force 
located near  the sources of  relatively cheap food,  raised some of  its own 
subsistence, and worked in agriculture some of the time. 
F r o m  the viewpoint  of  the industr ial  capitalist ,  under  these condit ions,  the 
price of  l abor  could remain  below its cost of  reproduct ion.  Higher-priced 
urban  craftsmen, dependent  on the marke t  for  expensive food and organized 
to cont ro l  p roduct ion  and bargain  for  wages, lost out. But ci ty-based mer- 
chants played a fundamenta l  par t  in creat ing and sustaining the system. 
Fur the rmore ,  the more  capital- intensive branches  of  product ion,  and  those 
in which quick response to marke t  changes was crucial,  remained in cities or  
generated new, specialized urban centers. Finally,  major  por t  cities drew 
rural  products  into in ternat ional  trade. Consider  Nantes  and St. Malo,  
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whose merchants shipped linens from hundreds of villages throughout Brit- 
tany, Normandy, Perche, Maine and Anjou to Africa and the Americas. Or 
think of Hamburg, which "drew linen from Silesia, Saxony . . .  Westfalia, 
Bohemia, Moravia, Swabia, Styria and Switzerland, but also from closer 
regions such as Mecklenberg, Holstein, Bremen and L0beck"; with the 
possible exception of Bremen and LiJbeck, these were essentially regions of 
rural protoindustry.'9 
If we moved our imaginations back to 1750, blanked out our knowledge of 
things to come, and projected the future of such a system, we would most 
likely predict an increasing division of labor between town and country- but 
a division of labor in which cities housed Europe's rentiers, officials and large 
capitalists as they specialized in marketing, administration and services, but 
not manufacturing. We might well anticipate a countryside with a growing 
proletariat working in both agriculture and manufacturing. Rural sites, in 
that projection, would remain the active sites of proletarianization, while 
those who controlled the means of production would concentrate increasing- 
ly in cities. 
Capital Concentration and its Correlates 
That is not what happened. Many industrial regions underwent the sequence 
described for the uplands of Zurich by Rudolf Braun: an eighteenth-century 
explosion of textile production into the previously poor, sparsely settled and 
agricultural hill country, followed by a nineteenth-century reflux to Zurich 
and nearby towns. 20 After protoindustrialization, deindustrialization. In 
many rural areas, whether mainly industrial or agricultural, the nineteenth 
century brought an exodus of wage-workers, and then of smallholders, 
sharecroppers, and petty tenants. The result was to leave behind the larger 
farmers, both owners and leaseholders. It was often to make the farm less 
dependent on hired labor, and more dependent on family labor, than it had 
been for centuries. 2~ After proletarianization, we might say, "peasantiza- 
tion." The active sites of proletarianization shifted to the cities. 
The phrase "industrial revolution" gives a misleading account of what 
changed. The account is misleading because it emphasizes technological 
changes, and draws attention away from the redeployment of capital. Never- 
theless, the dramatic words signal that something drastic did happen in 
Europe during the nineteenth century. What was it? Here were the obvious 
features of that nineteenth-century reversal: 
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1. a great concentration of capital, combined with a readiness of 
capitalists to shift their operations from one locus to another, depending 
on the chances for profit; 
2. an effort by capitalists to take control of the whole productive process, 
using cooptation, coercion, and reorganization to undermine the ability 
of workers to determine the allocation of the factors of production, 
including their own labor power; 
3. grouping of the workers in common locales, on coordinated work 
schedules, under continuous surveillance and standard discipline, in order 
to increase the return from their labor; 
4. reliance on machines and inanimate sources of power to accomplish 
those ends. 
These measures, in their turn, had powerful consequences: 
5. movement of the loci of production toward concentrations of capital 
and/or  sources of power; 
6. convergence of the labor force on those loci of production and 
employment; 
7. departure of proletarians from the countryside; 
8. withdrawal of proletarian labor from agriculture, with the concomi- 
tant necessity of drawing the full reproduction cost of labor from non- 
agricultural employment; 
9. de-industrialization of many previously industrial areas. 
These changes amounted to an "implosion" of industrial production into 
cities, and its radical separation from agriculture. 
Because changes of this sort prevailed when Westerners began formulating 
their theories of industrial capitalism, a number of historical misconceptions 
crept into those theories. Three of them in particular obscured the historical 
experience. The first was the idea that industrialization consisted of the 
expansion of disciplined production in large, power-driven, machine-based, 
spatially-concentrated units. The second was the notion that true proletar- 
ians worked under close surveillance in such units, and that proletarianiza- 
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tion therefore occurred mainly in cities and in factories. The third embodied 
a false afortiori argument, the same one Gerhard Hanke has criticized in 
Bavarian historiography: that if the nineteenth-century countrysides were 
essentially peasant and agricultural, then of course the countrysides of earlier 
centuries must have been even more essentially peasant and agricultural. The 
three misapprehensions made it easy to forget what earlier generations had 
seen for themselves: the great protoindustrialization of Europe's hinterlands, 
and the massive proletarianization of its population before the nineteenth- 
century urban implosion. 
At the cost of oversimplification, Figure 1 (a-d); illustrates what is at issue. 
Figure la points out that conventional ideas of industrialization are implicit- 
ly two-dimensional: they include both increase in the scale of producing units 
and expansion in the production of manufactured goods. In principle, 
increasing scale can occur without an expansion of production; we might call 
that extreme case concentration. Likewise, production can expand without 
increases in the scale of producing units; that extreme, we call protoindus- 
trialization. A coordinated change in both dimensions deserves the full name 
industrialization. 
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Fig. I. Schematic views of industrialization. 
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That representation makes it easier to state the difference between standard 
accounts of industrialization and the accounts that have been emerging from 
a fuller appreciation of protoindustrialization. Figure I b caricatures the 
Industrial Revolution account: little increase in manufacturing occurred 
until the development of new technologies which entailed dramatic rises in 
the scale of production; the efficiency of the new technology and organiza- 
tion then produced a large expansion of manufacturing. Figure I c describes 
protoindustralization without concentration: a large expansion of manufac- 
turing without change in the scale of producing units eventually ceases when 
concentration elsewhere drives local producers out of the market; the subse- 
quent decline in manufacturing leaves the area even less industrial than when 
the process began. Figure ld, finally, sketches an ideal-typical transition 
from protoindustrialization to full industrialization: considerable expansion 
of manufacturing without increases in scale, followed by dramatic concen- 
tration. 
The quantitative argument in the growing literature on protoindustrializa- 
tion runs something like this: area by area, the situation described by Figure 
1 b - "Industrial Revolution" - was quite rare in Europe, confined mainly to 
places in which coal deposits made rapid large-scale industrialization attrac- 
tive to capitalists. Situation c - protoindustrialization followed by deindus- 
trialization - was actually the most frequent circumstance; small area by 
small area, most of Europe entered the twentieth century more purely 
agricultural than it had been for centuries before. During the twentieth 
century, to be sure, some of those re-ruralized areas, such as the region of 
Cholet in western France, again took up manufacturing as capitalists built 
small factories in the countryside to take advantage of cheap land and labor. 
Situation d, nevertheless, describes the most common path by which concen- 
trated industry came into being: a path from pr0toindustrialization to con- 
centration. If so, the three standard misconceptions - the equation of indus- 
trialization with concentration, the identification of proletarianization with 
concentration, the afortiori peasantization of the past - badly distort the 
history of European industrialization. 
The three misconceptions survive because they fit together neatly in a linear 
model of industrialization. If we think of industrialization as an irreversible 
technical, organizational, and cultural liberation from a traditional past, 
cumulative and ever-accelerating, then it is natural to imagine the past as 
monolithic and stable: Traditional Peasant Society. A whole series of related 
misperceptions reinforce the basic image: the supposed immobility of pre-in- 
dustrial poulations, the particularism and irrationality of peasant life, the 
spread of rational calculation with industrialism, the development of a 
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"flight" from the countryside as urban diversions and opportunities ap- 
peared, the decline in social control as a consequence of urbanization and 
industrialization, the shock and disorder produced by the first confrontation 
of rural migrants with the demands of urban life and w o r k . . ,  in short, the 
commonsense sociology of the nineteenth century. 
As generalizations, all these ideas have shattered on contact with the last few 
decades' research on European economic and social history. For example, 
Abel Chatelain's review of temporary migration in France makes it clear how 
vast and lively were the networks of labor mobility before the growth of big 
industrial cities, and how in many instances the effect of industrial concentra- 
tion was actually to fix people in place, to slow them down. 22 Yet the whole 
complex of ideas emerged at a time when current trends gave it some 
plausibility: in the later nineteenth century, migration from the countryside 
to cities w a s  speeding up, cities were  coming to monopolize industrial 
production, a new, massive, disciplined but often angry factory-based pro- 
letariat d i d s e e m  to be forming, and so on down the list. The nineteenth-cen- 
tury errors were to generalize a momentary condition, to extrapolate its 
changes into a continuous one-directional process, to exaggerate the turbu- 
lence and disorder of the moment as compared to previous moments, and to 
adopt faulty notions of causes and effects. Those are serious errors, but 
common and understandable ones. 
Deindustrialization 
Similar errors have often affected discussions of deindustrialization. The 
frequency of deindustrialization is probably an even more difficult historical 
fact to grasp than the importance of protoindustry as the setting for the 
growth of the proletariat, because of the assumption that industrialization is 
an irreversible process. If the process normally moves in only one direction, 
then its reversal is abnormal, pathological, a failure. True, the purest liberal 
discussion of industrialization makes room for a competition in which while 
some regions succeed some other regions will inevitably make an effort and 
fail. But the chief cases in point are normally peripheral areas brought into 
the sphere of an expanding industrial power. Maurice L6vy-Leboyer traces 
the nineteenth-century deindustrialization under European influence in In- 
dia, the Middle East, and Latin America, then remarks that "In Europe, the 
evil was not unknown, although it was less extensive," citing Sicily and' 
southern Italy as prime examples. 23 He then approves the recommendation 
of a Belgian commission which, in 1833, countered the pleas of Flemish 
merchants for restrictions on the export of flax with the argument that 
Flanders should be eager to sell its raw materials on the international market. 
"The case of Flanders," continues L6vy-Leboyer, 
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is of general importance. International competition requires incessant adaptation to new 
structures. The balance among western countries is the result of multiple exchanges which 
involve the whole range of manufactured products, with none having priority. Manchester 
maintained its position in western markets by reorienting its sales upstream: for finished 
goods, its industrialists substituted spun goods, and then textile looms. One is hard put to see 
why new nations could not improve their level of living by specializing in primary industry. 
From that point of view, deindustrialization is desirable, on lhe obvious condition that the 
countries in question have crops which can be used by the West3 a 
To be sure, deindustrialization is always easier to advocate for other areas 
than one's own. It is fascinating, nonetheless, to go through a collection of 
essays such as the L6on/Crouzet/Gascon Industrialization en Europe au 
X I X e  sibcle looking for instances of deindustrialization in the European 
experience. 25 The instances leap to the eye. Jordi Nadal shows us the consid- 
erable decline of industrial activity in southeastern Spain during the nine- 
teenth century, J. R. Harris sketches the collapse of skilled metal-working 
and textile production in Liverpool's hinterland as the port itself prospered 
during the same century, Yves Lequin maps out the expansion and contrac- 
tion of several forms of manufacturing in the mountainous regions of the 
Isere, and so on. In case after case, we see signs of a deliberate movement of 
capital away from unprofitable industries, followed inevitably by a decline 
in employment, and often capped by the near-disappearance of manufactur- 
ing as an economic base. 
Yves Lequin's evidence has a particular interest, since it provides a fore- 
taste of the material presented in his later treatment of Lyon's region as a 
whole. Lequin's ouvriers de la rbgion lyonnaise is one of our most valuable 
stimuli for  reflection on deindustrialization. 26 It deals with the later expe- 
rience of an urban region which went through all phases of the transforma- 
tions we have been examining: growth of a powerful silk industry heavily 
concentrated in the regional capital, Lyon, during the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries; great concentration of capital during the eighteenth 
century; increasing competitive pressure from other centers and other fabrics 
toward the end of the century; dispersion of important parts of the industry 
throughout the Lyonnais region during the early nineteenth centuryP Le- 
quin's study of the Lyonnais after 1848 demonstrates the strong orientation 
of industrial activity throughout the region's scattered villages and towns to 
the great merchant city, the repeated relocation of different divisions of the 
textile and metal-working industries within the region, and the ultimate 
concentration of almost all industrial activity in Lyon, its immediate vicinity, 
and a few other important cities. His evidence makes a strong, if indirect, case 
for the peopling of Lyon's nineteenth-century industry by workers who 
came, not from agriculture, but from other industrial centers- especially the 
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deindustrializing towns and villages of the hinterland. Thus it portrays a 
dramatic instance of deindustrialization as a redistribution of capital and 
labor within the same regional system. 
Not all deindustrialization, however, operates at a regional scale, or occurs in 
the course of the redistribution of the same industry. As a first rough 
taxonomy of the alternatives, we might divide up the net movements of 
capital which produce deindustrialization in this way: 
LOCAL WITHIN REGION INTERREGIONAL 
WITHIN 
INDUSTRY competi t ion reorganization runaway shop 
BETWEEN change in 
INDUSTRIES spec ia l ty  reinvestment flight 
The nineteenth-century Lyonnais would then qualify mainly as a case of 
"reorganization": net movements of capital within the same industries in the 
same region, which deindustrialized important parts of the hinterland, but 
not the whole region. Clearly we want to distinguish that case from the 
runaway shop, or the simultaneous collapse of industry and industrial 
region. From the perspective of an individual village or villager, they may 
look quite similar; from the perspective of economic and social history - or, 
for that matter, national policy - they are fundamentally different. The 
research we undertake should tell us how and why. 
Conclusions 
An unwary traveler in Paris or London often straightens out the river in his 
imagination, and then makes terrible deductions about the shortest path 
from one place to another within the city. If he follows up those deductions 
without consulting a well-drawn map, he finds himself wandering, worn, and 
confused. Neither the Seine nor the Thames comes close to describing a 
straight line. Similarly, a straight-line model of industrialization is not 
merely inaccurate in itself; it leads to faulty, costly deductions about the 
likely consequences and correlates of the whole process. The Industrial 
Revolution model of industrialization follows a straight line from agriculture 
to handicraft to full-scale industry, with handicraft a weak anticipation of' 
full-scale industry. That model not only exaggerates the role of technology 
and foreshortens the history of industrial production, but also - at least for 
the European experience - misstates the relationships between urban and 
rural capital and labor. The classic Marxist model, with its intermediate 
stage of Manufacture drawing heavily on rural labor, improves our under- 
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standing of the historical terrain by putting an appropriate bend in the river 
of industrialization. It also improves on the Industrial Revolution model by 
drawing attention to the accumulation and redeployment of capital. Yet the 
classic Marxist model, too, exaggerates the importance of technological 
change, and underestimates the interdependence of changes in city and 
country, of alterations in the organization of industry and agriculture. 
The accumulating research organized - pro and con - around the idea of 
protoindustrialization points the way to an enriched understanding of the 
whole process of industrialization. It not only provides a clearer sense of the 
centrality and complexity of small-scale production, but also shifts our 
attention from technology to movements of capital. That is all to the good. It 
will not do, however, to construct a new linear model in which protoindustry 
(however well described) becomes the standard intermediate stage in a march 
from an agrarian world with a few urban outposts of craft production to an 
industrial world coupling large cities to "industrialized" agriculture. For one 
thing, as we have seen, most European areas of protoindustrial production 
entered the twentieth century more purely agricultural than they had been 
for centuries before, and with the family farm the dominant setting for 
agricultural production. For another, at every stage we witness transfers of 
capital simultaneously causing rises in the industrial activity of some regions 
and declines in the industrial activity of others. Our new models of such a 
process must not be linear, but dialectical. 
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